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The European Union (EU) Water Framework Directive (WFD) has the overall objective of achieving good ecological status for all 
water bodies by 2015. It is up to the individual 
Member States to designate a “Competent 
Authority” that will be responsible for preparing 
and implementing River Basin Management Plans 
for each River Basin District, that is, the new unit 
of management of water resources introduced by 
the directive. 
In addition to environmental standards, the 
Water Framework Directive requires public 
participation and cost recovery from primary 
water uses, including environmental costs, as 
part of the River Basin process. The requirements 
for public participation in the Water Framework 
Directive are not as strong as those contained in 
the Aarhus Convention (United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe 1998) which requires 
public participation in environmental matters to 
be guaranteed. Active involvement is only to be 
“encouraged” according to Article 14 of the Water 
Framework Directive (European Commission 
2000). 
If stakeholder engagement is to be meaningful, 
it has to include defining priorities.  This is in 
conflict with both economic analysis, which 
claims to be able to determine not only appropriate 
priorities but also the optimal outcome, and also 
with the fixed standards defined by the directive. 
Economic analysis claims to be able to determine 
what the optimum water quality standards are and 
this also conflicts with the fixed standards in the 
Directive (Green 2003). The Water Framework 
Directive consequently embodies a series of 
internal contradictions that had already become 
apparent during the development phase of the text 
(Kaika 2003).
In an attempt to solve these contradictions, 
the final text of the directive introduces scope for 
exceptions and derogations. Member States are 
allowed to take into account the local geographical 
and climatic conditions as well as economic, 
social, and environmental impacts of full pricing 
policies (European Commission 2000). There is 
also the option of not applying full cost recovery 
to a specific water use (Lanz and Scheuer 2001) 
and under Article 4.4, the deadlines to achieve 
the environmental objectives can be extended 
to a maximum of two updates of the river basin 
management plan, that is 12 years, as the plans 
must be updated every 6 years. The directive 
gives a list of reasons such as technical feasibility, 
disproportionate costs, and natural conditions. 
Hence, the key principles to improve the state of 
Europe’s waters are also the source of important 
contradictions that may cause the implementation 
of the Water Framework Directive to become an 
endless process of obtaining derogations and 
exceptions, which may result in the relaxation of 
the targets defined in the directive. 
Successful implementation of the Water 
Framework Directive could be measured ultimately 
in terms of achieving the environmental objectives 
and avoiding delays and relaxation of those 
targets. We argue that in order to be successful, 
the institution chosen to carry out the River 
Basin Planning (RBP) process needs to be able to 
influence other key stakeholders. The competent 
authority will also have to provide a forum in 
which to involve all the stakeholders relevant to 
river basin planning. 
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Within the United Kingdom (UK), there 
are increasing differences between practice in 
England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, 
both in terms of institutions and legislation. The 
implementation of the Water Framework Directive 
is no exception. Hence, this paper will focus on 
England, where 95 percent of water bodies are at 
risk of failing the 2015 objectives. High population 
densities and future development are the main 
threats to England’s water resources. 
In contrast with the principles of Integrated 
Water Resources Management (IWRM) and the 
Water Framework Directive, England is a very 
centralized country. This is reflected in the choice 
of the Environment Agency as competent authority. 
The Environment Agency (EA) is the public body 
responsible for planning and managing water 
resources (Environment Agency 2004) including 
water quality and abstraction licenses. The 
Environment Agency was established by the 1995 
Environment Act and it is a non-departmental public 
body of the Department for the Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs (Defra) in England but it has no 
direct democratic oversight. 
England: Context
England has a temperate climate where rainfall 
does not vary greatly from month to month. 
Rainfall is 604 mm/year in the east, compared to 
1312 mm/year in the west.  Although per capita 
availability of water in some parts is similar to that 
of Somalia, this is a misleading comparison. Water 
scarcity tends to happen in countries were the 
major water user is irrigation (Berbel et al. 2005) 
and only supplementary irrigation is required in 
some parts of England (Weatherhead et al. 1994). 
In European terms, English rivers are small, 
although there is a variety in length, width, and 
size. Most of the rivers are lowland, low-energy 
except in upland areas where there are high 
energy rivers that flood quickly. Rivers fulfill 
a variety of functions, including water supply, 
industry, commerce, irrigation and are also used 
for wastewater discharge from sewage treatment 
works and other sources. There is some very 
minor commercial fishing and most fishing is for 
recreation. However, the main recreational uses 
are riverside ones such as walking or enjoying 
the landscape and wildlife (Tunstall and Green 
2003). Navigation is mainly recreational although 
there is a long history of commercial navigation 
(Environment Agency 2001).
In terms of quality, the first problem faced is 
mainly diffuse pollution from both agricultural and 
urban areas.  Secondly, England was the first country 
to industrialize and rivers were extensively adapted 
during that process, starting with construction 
of weirs and races for water mills, and going on 
through canalization for navigation, and reservoirs 
to support navigation.  Petts and Wood (1988) have 
suggested that as a result of all these activities, 
around 89 percent of United Kingdom’s rivers are 
regulated or modified to some extent.  Rivers are 
an integral part of the potable water supply system 
and of the wastewater treatment system: given the 
small size of the rivers, it is not uncommon for 
the outflow of the wastewater treatment works 
to constitute 60 percent of the base flow of the 
river. Despite a great improvement in the quality 
of water bodies since the 1990s (Environment 
Agency 2002) 95 percent of rivers are currently 
at risk of failing the environmental objectives of 
the Water Framework Directive (Department for 
the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 2005). 
Low-flows caused by over-abstraction of water is 
an important issue and the Environment Agency 
recently estimated that current abstractions should 
be reduced by under two per cent in order to avoid 
environmental damage (Environment Agency 
2004).  
England has, for Europe, quite high domestic 
water usage (150 liters per capita per day) and 
it is densely populated (343 people per sq km) 
accounting for 83 percent of the total United 
Kingdom population of 49.1 million. Around 
21 percent of land is already in some form of 
urban usage and the areas covered by some form 
of environmental designation total 42 percent, 
including national parks, areas of outstanding 
natural beauty, sites of special interest, and 
green belts. Some areas are covered by multiple 
designations, so the proportion is somewhat 
less. By 2020 there will be around 4 million new 
homes and much of the growth will take place in 
south-east England, which is also the driest part 
of the country (Environment Agency 2004).  In 
southeast England, an area roughly equivalent to 
the Netherlands in both population and size, the 
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population density exceeds 800 people per sq km 
and some 80 percent of non-urban land is covered 
by one or more environmental designations. Land is 
a scarce resource in England and in order to reduce 
new land take, there is a target of 60 percent of new 
homes to be built on Brownfield land (Office of 
the Deputy Prime Minister 2004) and to increase 
residential densities which currently average 27 
dwellings per hectare. 
Under pressure from reformers at different times, 
government in England has become progressively 
more centralized. The result was a reduction from 
around 11,000 parish councils, roughly equivalent 
to 35,000 communes in France, to the current 409 
district, county or unitary authorities. It is true that 
there are an additional 10,000 or so District or 
Parish Councils, but these have negligible powers 
and funding.  In turn, the powers and funding of 
local authorities have been progressively reduced. 
Since England has no written constitution, local 
authorities have no constitutionally reserved 
powers or sources of funding; 52 percent of local 
government funding is directly through grants from 
central government and only 26 percent is raised 
through local taxes (Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister 2005).  The local authorities are, however, 
responsible both for land use or spatial planning 
and the control of development—and enforcement 
levels for development control are high.  In the 
nineteenth century, it was those who  wished to see 
sanitation and water to be introduced by the local 
authorities who sought to reduce the number of 
local authorities (Best 1979), notably the abolition 
of the parishes which were roughly equivalent 
to the French communes.  In the old rural areas 
there are some 220 or so Internal Drainage Boards. 
Originally, at least some of these were similar in 
nature to the Dutch Waterschappen but they were 
brought under the directing authority of central 
government in the 1930s. There is also a complete 
absence of the Water User Associations found in 
other countries, notably Germany, France, Spain, 
and the United States.  
Wastewater and water services were privatized 
in 1989 primarily for ideological reasons so no 
attempt was made to promote efficiency either 
through competition or through the principles 
underlying IWRM (Green 2001).  Instead, the 
then existing patchwork of combined water and 
wastewater companies and local water supply 
companies were privatized as they stood.  Hence, 
in some areas one company supplies water and 
wastewater services, but across the street, the first 
company may supply wastewater services, with a 
water supply only company providing the water. 
While the Environment Agency is the 
environmental regulator, the Office of Water 
Services is the economic regulator of the water and 
sewerage industry in England & Wales. The Office 
of Water Services set limits on what companies 
can charge and has a duty to ensure that companies 
carry out their responsibilities, are efficient, and 
meet the principles of sustainable development 
(Office of Water Services 2005). 
The Environment Agency has been nominated as 
“Competent Authority” in England. At no point was 
there any open discussion of possible institutional 
options for the competent authority; it seems that 
an early decision was taken that this would be 
the Environment Agency.  It is not clear whether 
this was a decision thrust upon the Environment 
Agency or whether the agency actively sought this 
role.  Our suspicion is that it was the latter.  The 
problem for the agency is that it has neither the 
powers nor the funding necessary to deliver the 
requirements of the Water Framework Directive.
The Environment Agency has a number of 
characteristics that are relevant:
It is a scientific bureaucracy with a very 
strong public service ethos and a commitment 
to enhancing the environment.  However, 
the traditional public service ethos was to 
determine what the public (or the environment) 
need, determine the best course of action to 
satisfy that need, and implement that course 
of action.  It was reported that, immediately 
after the 1997 election, the incoming Minister 
said to the then Chief Executive of the 
agency that the institution needed to be more 
open and transparent.  The agency went into 
shock because it believed that it was open 
and transparent, and responded as a scientific 
bureaucracy should be expected: it appointed 
an expert on a part-time basis to tell them it 
was involved in being open and transparent.
It is an agency of government with Chair, 
Chief Executive, and Board appointed through 
the public appointments procedure.  It is thus 
1.
2.
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subject to only indirect democratic control.
The agency fulfills a number of overlapping 
roles.
The Agency was created by the Prime Minister 
Major government by amalgamating a number of 
different organizations.  The discussions at the 
time make it clear that a major consideration at the 
time was to minimize costs rather than maximize 
effectiveness.  The result is a body with two major 
regulatory and planning functions:
All media pollution control, and
Integrated water resource management coupled 
to a prime responsibility for constructing and 
maintaining flood risk and coastal defense 
works.
In financial terms, by far the largest element of 
income and expenditure is on flood risk and coastal 
defense works. The agency is essentially funded 
through grants from central government.  Unlike 
the French Agence de l’eau, the agency has no 
real powers to directly raise revenue: the revenue 
from the water resource and other functions being 
intended solely to cover the administrative costs of 
issuing abstraction licenses and so on.  These three 
areas of activity have created a major problem for 
the agency in terms of what its institutional structure 
should be, particularly when one of its tasks is to 
deliver the program of investment for a single 
function.  If the catchment is the logical framework 
for managing water, it is not when considering 
either air pollution or solid waste in an all media 
integrated approach to pollution management.  In 
a catchment approach, there is a danger that it will 
be captured by the flood risk management function 
simply because that is the one with money.  The 
inherently multi- and inter-disciplinary nature 
of these activities makes defining an appropriate 
institutional structure even more difficult.
If this sounds critical of the agency, then this 
is because learning is the primary requirement for 
improving performance.  If we do not review our 
performance, identifying successes and failures, 
then it is unlikely that we will do better.  Equally, 
if we want (as we should) institutions that are 
both innovative and adaptive, then some of those 
experiments will fail.  So, the faster we try to 
innovate, the greater the number of successful 




didn’t succeed but from which we can learn useful 
lessons.   We have, therefore, to accept and even 
welcome failures by our institutions, provided that 
those failures are the result of innovation and do 
not simply repeat past failures.
What is “Competency”?
Calling for a “competent” authority raises 
the obvious question of what do we mean by 
competent?  In turn, how then should we seek 
to measure the success of an institution?  This 
requires us to first define an institution and the 
conventional definition (North 1990, Scott 1995) 
is adopted here: that an institution is defined by the 
existence of a formal or informal system of rules. 
These prescribe what it must or may do and what 
it may not do, and where it can do it.  In turn, these 
rules mean that any institution has both functional 
and geographical boundaries.  
We have more general requirements for 
institutions as well: we need them to be adaptive, 
able to adjust successfully to changing conditions. 
We also want them to be innovative: introducing 
new and better means of resolving problems.  They 
must therefore be capable of changing and learning. 
Since not all innovations will succeed, we have to 
expect institutions to fail on occasions.  Indeed, we 
want more successful failures, those failures from 
which we learn how to be more successful or what 
is likely to be a successful innovation.
Any institution is also constrained by internal 
and external factors.  Young (1999) has argued 
that institutions have to “fit” their context, and 
discussed the problems of scale and interplay. 
Thus, the external argument is that a competent 
authority for delivering IWRM must have a 
geographical reach over a catchment and combine 
all water function management as well as land 
use management.  But this may then conflict with 
the internal constraints of an institution as to its 
ideal geographical and functional spread.  We 
may ask: how big should an institution be if it is 
to function most effectively? This ideal size of 
an institution may be argued to occur at the point 
where the economies of scale and scope run into 
diseconomies of scale and scope, particularly those 
of information and communication.   There is then 
no reason why these internal constraints should 
result in an institution whose boundaries coincide 
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with the physical system that it seeks to manage.
At the same time, the land/water system is 
closely coupled to other systems, each of which has 
its own logical boundaries and whose management 
is subject to the same problems of economies 
versus diseconomies of scale and scope.  Water 
management is often included in institutions 
that have responsibility for agriculture and also 
logically for food.  It is then logical to include 
responsibilities for fisheries and forestry into that 
institution, and a general responsibility for rural 
development.  There is a similar logic for including 
water supply and sanitation into an institution 
responsible for health; indeed, health was the 
rationale for development of water supply and 
sanitation in the 19th Century municipalities (Best 
1979).  If everything is related to everything else, 
then deciding where is the least damaging point to 
define boundaries is quite problematic.  Seeking 
integration through the traditional approach starts 
to look unpromising.  The problem is compounded 
if we cannot simply invent a new institution, either 
because there is path dependency (Putnam 1993, 
Cleaver 2000), or constitutional reasons define 
some areas of responsibility to specific levels of 
government.  
Instead, we argue that the problem is how to 
deliver integration through a fragmented mosaic of 
institutions.  This means that a successful institution 
is one that is highly successful at influencing the 
actions of others and that includes an effective 
means of co-ordinating the actions of different 
institutions.  This approach is also consistent 
with the emergent approach to sustainable water 
management which stresses, for example, demand 
management rather than providing additional 
water sources, and source control rather than end 
of pipe treatment.  Rather than building flood 
alleviation schemes, wastewater treatment works 
and reservoirs, water management institutions are 
increasingly focused on changing the behavior of 
others.
Therefore, in defining a “competent authority” 
under the Water Framework Directive, the logic is 
first to determine which institutions have the power 
to undertake, to fund, to regulate or otherwise 
influence the adoption of particular interventions or 
actions.  These “institutional maps” (Green 2003) 
are defined by specific actions such as the setting of 
water efficiency standards for water fittings and for 
water using equipment. If a different intervention 
strategy is invented then it may prove that a new 
set of institutions are key stakeholders in the rate 
and success of the take-up of that technology or 
behavior.  In addition, it may turn out that there 
are overlaps or gaps between the functional and 
geographic boundaries of the different stakeholder 
institutions.  In the case of England, the most 
important of these stakeholders are:
Local and regional planning bodies with 
responsibility for development control; 
Office of Water Services, the price and quality 
regulators, who agree on investment plans 
with the wastewater and water companies and 
determine the price rises required to fund those 
plans; 
Department for the Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs as the ministry responsible 
for implementing the Common Agricultural 
Policy, and thus farming practices as they 
impact upon the water environment; and 
The Department for Communities and Local 
Government (former Office of the Deputy 
Prime Minister) as the ministry with overall 
responsibility for urban development, planning, 
and building regulation. 
Population density is the biggest threat to water 
resources so perhaps the most critical of those 
stakeholders are the Regional Assemblies, made 
up of representatives from the constituent local 
authorities and others.  The Regional Assemblies 
are responsible for preparing the Regional Spatial 
Strategy, the overarching land use strategy 
(Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 2004).  It 
is clearly critical that these strategic land plans 
embody water management concerns.  The worst 
possible outcome would be a plethora of plans, 
and particularly of river basin management plans, 
which sit beside and outside of the Regional Spatial 
Strategies. Those Regional Spatial Strategies are 
themselves required to be developed through a 
process of stakeholder engagement (Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister 2004) as opposed to the 
mere consultative process required for river basin 
management plans under the Water Framework 
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influence these key stakeholders then it will not be 
able to deliver on the Water Framework Directive 
(Le Quesne and Green 2005).
Absent from this list of key stakeholders are the 
environmental non-governmental organizations. 
This is because the Environment Agency has a 
central commitment to environmental conservation. 
In particular, the Chief Executive of the agency was 
successively Chief Executive of the Royal Society 
for the Protection of Birds, the most important 
environmental non-governmental organization, 
and then of English Nature, the government agency 
with responsibility for environmental conservation. 
This leaves other environmental non-governmental 
organizations, such as the World Wildlife Fund, 
without an obvious ecological niche.
In seeking to influence these other stakeholders, 
the agency will have to recognize the asymmetries 
of interest among the stakeholders. The local 
authorities may have little to gain from working 
closely with the agency and a lot to lose.  The 
local authorities have multiple objectives and 
constraints with which they must cope, including 
the needs either of socio-economic regeneration or 
of accommodating large inflows of development. 
Taking account of water management issues will 
add to their difficulties and will restrict both where 
development can take place and the form of that 
development.
The competent authority will have not only 
to be very successful at influencing the other 
stakeholders, but also at co-ordinating the actions 
of those other stakeholders.  Key to both tasks is the 
establishment of some form of stakeholder forum 
for each catchment; what is at issue is the power 
that would reside in each of those fora and hence 
in each stakeholder.  Each forum could be simply 
a sounding board and means of liaison between 
the different stakeholders, the Environment 
Agency’s original proposal for implementing the 
Water Framework Directive (Environment Agency 
2005).  Or, it might make recommendations to the 
different stakeholders as to the actions each should 
take as part of the program of actions necessary 
to deliver the objectives of the Water Framework 
Directive.  Finally, it might decide on the river 
basin management plan and the program of action 
necessary to implement it.
Given the lack of experience in England of such 
approaches, it would be useful to allow different 
forms to emerge in different catchments, as the 
local stakeholders decide.  Within each catchment 
forum, there would then also be scope for adopting 
different processes; that process has been variously 
framed in quite different ways as “conflict 
resolution” (Acland 1990, Handmer et al. 1991, 
Priscoli 1996), “consensus building” (Innes 1996), 
“future search” (Weisbord and Janoff 1995), “social 
learning” (Pahl-Wostl 2002, Craps 2003, Ison et al. 
2004, HarmoniCOP 2005) and “learning alliances” 
(Adank et al. 2006).  What is required is an overall 
system for evaluating the relative success of each 
different forum.  In the short run, that evaluation 
has to focus upon process rather than outcomes, 
and the key process characteristic is change: the 
nature and extent of the changes, particularly in the 
understandings of each stakeholder of each other 
(Green et al. 2004).
We are further faced with the problem of 
delivering integration through functional line 
budgets.  Some general source of revenue which 
could be used for general purposes to enhance the 
performance of the catchment would be a useful 
lubricant here.  In the past, the introduction of 
specific charges for abstractions and discharges  to 
cover the administrative costs for permitting have 
been rejected when they have been considered as 
possible economic instruments (Department of the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions 1997, 
2000).  Our proposal here is instead for a levy as 
a source of revenue rather than any expectation 
that such a levy would have any effect upon land 
and water users.  A small charge, the simplest form 
being that of a property tax, would generate funds 
which could then make it easier to put together 
other funding from the line budgets of the different 
public and private stakeholders.  Decisions as to 
the appropriate spending of these funds would be 
determined by the stakeholder fora. 
Conclusions
Introducing IWRM requires very different 
institutional practice than we have seen in the past in 
England.  It is a challenge for which the centralized 
government tradition of England has ill-prepared 
the people.  Indeed, the adoption without discussion 
of the Environment Agency as the competent 
authority under the Water Framework Directive is 
71
UCOWR
                                       Implementing the Water Framework Directive
Journal of Contemporary Water researCh & eduCation
a hang-over from that centralized tradition. If the 
Environment Agency as the competent authority is 
to be successful, and perhaps even survive, it has 
to rapidly become exceedingly good at two tasks:
Influencing the other stakeholders who have 
the power or funding to deliver the objectives 
of the Water Framework Directive.
Building and sustaining those fora of 
all stakeholders that enable the different 
stakeholders to co-ordinate their actions.
These, we argue, are the two key criteria for 
success of all competent authorities designated 
under the Water Framework Directive.  A further 
more general criterion for successful water 
management institutions is that they have to be 
both innovative and adaptive.
We consider that a forum of stakeholders for 
each catchment, with responsibility for setting 
out the program of actions necessary to deliver 
the objectives of the Water Framework Directive 
is a necessary pre-condition for success.  But, 
given the lack of experience in such fora, and in 
the processes which such a forum should adopt, 
it is appropriate to experiment with different 
approaches in different catchments, and compare 
the success of each approach.
A significant problem in implementing the 
Water Framework Directive is likely to be that of 
trying to do so using functional line budgets.  A 
“catchment conservancy levy” on all land use, 
which could be used on any action that would 
improve the ecological and economic performance 
of the catchment could be a useful tool in this 
regard.
Finally, we argue that in a country where land 
is already being used very intensely, the most 
important form of integration is between land and 
water management.  In consequence, it is within 
in the Regional Spatial Strategies and Local 
Development Frameworks that it is essential to 
embed water management concerns. If to do so it 
is necessary to sacrifice river basin management 
plans, then this would be a desirable sacrifice. 
Overall, we argue, it is institutional implementation 
both in structure and in process that is the critical 
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